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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
by
Philip J. Pfeiffer* and W. Wendell Hall**
N the twentyfive years subsequent to the 1935 passage of the Wagner
Act and the creation of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),t
the field or practice of labor law, as it was referred to at that time, fo-
cused almost exclusively on union-management relations. While practition-
ers also dealt with issues under the Fair Labor Standards Act,2 the typical
labor lawyer devoted most of his time to the collective bargaining process,
contract negotiations, union election campaigns, unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings, and the like.
In the years that have followed that era, commencing with the enactment
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 labor law has expanded to the
broadened field of employment law. The major influencing factors were the
passage of additional federal laws4 relating to issues of employment discrimi-
nation and the presidential enactment of Executive Order No. 11,246, 5
which addressed equal employment opportunities within the ranks of gov-
ernment contractors. In addition to handling claims before federal agencies
such as the NLRB, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, during this period,
employment lawyers faced greatly increased litigation within the federal
courts due to the rising volume of employment discrimination cases. Thus,
at least by the early 1970s, employment law generally had undergone a
change of emphasis or was at least trending from an NLRB, federal agency
practice focusing upon union-management issues to a practice heavily in-
volving the federal courts in claims of discrimination against employees
based upon their status as members of minority groups.
The changing and expanding character of employment law has not abated
*Managing Partner, Fuibright & Jaworski, San Antonio, Texas.
* Participating Associate, Fulbright & Jaworski, San Antonio, Texas.
1. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, as reenacted by Act of June 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 136,
amended by Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 519, amended by Act of July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395,
and last amended by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1972 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
168 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. V 1987).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1987).
4. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as § 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796i (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
5. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965) (issued on Sept. 24, 1965), re-
printed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note 18 (1982).
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since that time. If anything, particularly within Texas, the rapidity with
which developments have occurred has increased. In just the last few years,
attorneys within Texas have seen the emphasis within the field of employ-
ment law shift once again. Although union-management issues and employ-
ment discrimination concerns remain the mainstays of employment law, the
rights of individual employees, without regard to their minority status, have
emerged as major points of attention. In contrast with the 1960s and 1970s
when the overwhelming majority of activity was within the federal courts
and with federal agencies, the period since 1980 has seen a predominance of
state and, in particular, state court developments. Texas attorneys no longer
can consider the field of employment law as a narrow, specialty area of prac-
tice. The breadth of cases and issues addressed herein demonstrate that de-
velopments in employment law are now of concern to a large segment of the
Texas bar.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Nowhere have employment law developments been more pronounced
than with respect to the employment-at-will doctrine and wrongful dis-
charge issues generally. In Texas the state courts and the federal courts ap-
plying Texas law have had to wrestle increasingly frequently with a variety
of challenges to the long-established Texas rule of employment-at-will. 6
In accord with historical teachings of the law in virtually every state of the
Union, 7 the courts of Texas consistently held inviolate the employment-at-
will doctrine.8 Pursuant to this doctrine, Texas employers were free to ter-
6. See East Line & R. R.R. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888):
It is very generally, if not uniformly, held, when the term of service is left to the
discretion of either party, or the term left indefinite, or determinable by either
party, that either may put an end to it at will, and so without cause.
The traditional employment-at-will doctrine has otherwise been defined as follows:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and
to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right
which an employe may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the
same cause or want of cause as the employer.
Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled by Hutton v. Watters,
132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915). The at-will doctrine is defined by the American
Law Institute as follows: "Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to
employ and to serve create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon
notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of
time or by supervening events." Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 442 (1957); see also 9 S.
WILLISTON & W. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1017, at 129-30 (3d
ed. 1967 and Supp. 1986), which states:
Where the contract is not for a fixed term, and is, therefore, terminable at will,
though such notice as the nature of the contract made reasonable might be nec-
essary, there seems no general principle analogous to that in the law of tenancies
at will requiring notice of a certain length of time.
7. See generally A. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE 5-7 (Industrial Research Unit, the Wharton School, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania, Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 31, 1987) (common law
principle of employment-at-will was generally accepted in all jurisdictions).
8. See, e.g., Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (nurse's aid had no claim against employer for termination due
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minate employees for a good reason, a bad (but not illegal) reason, or for no
reason at all, where the employment agreement, usually oral, lacked a defi-
nite term.9
In contrast, action on the employer's part that established, or suggested,
that the employment was to be for a particular time period was held to rebut
the at-will presumption. For example, Texas courts have held that hiring an
employee at a stated sum per month constitutes an employment contract for
that period. 10 When the employer transmitted to the employee a letter con-
firming his employment and providing for additional bonus compensation to
be calculated at the end of a year's service, employment for a term of one
year was held to have been established."1 Under such circumstances, when
the employment is for a defined term, termination within that period gener-
ally must be for good cause.12
A. Judicially Created Exceptions
Although the Texas Legislature has enacted a limited number of statutory
exceptions or limitations upon the at-will rule, 13 until recently the Texas
courts exercised considerable judicial restraint in this area consistent with
the previously existing perception of Texas as a pro-business state. 14 In
1985, however, the Texas Supreme Court retreated from ninety-seven years
to aid's complaints concerning patient care); Watson v. Zep. Mfg. Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 179
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employment-at-will rule is not contrary to
public policy); United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Tull, 571 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer had right to terminate oral employment contract
that had indefinite term); NHA, Inc. v. Jones, 500 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employment contract was terminable at will); see also Claus v.
Gyorkey, 674 F.2d 427, 433 (5th Cir. 1982) (physician's indefinite tenure allowed termination
of his employment at employer's will); Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d
1051, 1054 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (indefinite employment period allowed termination of
an employee for his truthful testimony in a federal trial).
9. Cactus Feeders, Inc. v. Wittler, 509 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974,
no writ).
10. See Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 354 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1962, no writ); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1930, no writ).
11. Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); see also Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employer's hand-written letter of employment for an aca-
demic year was a term contract).
12. See, e.g., Ward v. Consol. Foods Corp., 480 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employment agreement on mandatory retirement subject to termina-
tion for good cause); Hoffrichter v. Brookhaven Country Club Corp., 448 S.W.2d 843, 844
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employment contract for definite period may
only be terminated for good cause); Porter v. United Motels, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no writ) (employer's motive for discharging employee is material
when good faith dissatisfaction is at issue).
13. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1988) (discharge for filing a
worker's compensation claim); Id. art. 5207a (discharge based on union membership or non-
membership); Id. art. 5207b (Vernon 1987) (discharge because of jury service); art. 5221k,
§ 1.02 (Vernon 1987) (Texas Commission on Human Rights Act) (discharge based on race,
color, handicap, religion, national origin, age or sex).




of precedent to enact a policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
In Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck 15 the court held that public policy, as
expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States that carry criminal
penalties, requires the creation of an exception to the at-will rule when an
employee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally illegal act
ordered by his employer.16
The language used in the court's opinion17 makes clear that Sabine Pilot
provides only a very narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
that Texas courts had followed since EastLine & R. R.R. v. Scott.18 It is
difficult to find fault with the court's conclusion as such, particularly since it
narrowly circumscribes the exception. The problem for businesses in Texas,
however, is that the creation of any exception grounded upon principles of
public policy encourages further litigation directed at expanding the
exception. 19
Of greatest concern is the concurring opinion of Justice Kilgarlin, joined
by Justice Ray, in which he attacked the entirety of the at-will doctrine and
thereby invited further challenges. 20 Justice Kilgarlin added that the mea-
sure of damages would include loss of both past and reasonably anticipated
15. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
16. Id. at 735.
17. Id.
18. 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99 (1888). Indeed, the court further explained:
That narrow exception covers only the discharge of an employee for the sole
reason that the employee refused to perform an illegal act. We further hold that
in the trial of such a case it is the plaintiff's burden to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that his discharge was for no reason other than his refusal to
perform an illegal act.
Id.
19. 687 S.W.2d at 735. It has been noted that problems for employers in wrongful dis-
charge cases are further exacerbated due to the "propensity of jurors to sympathize with em-
ployees." Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the
Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 223 (1982).
(T]here is the danger that the average jury will identify with, and therefore be-
lieve, the employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits by
disgruntled employees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion. If the
potential for vexatious suits by discharged employees is too great, employers will
be inhibited in exercising their best judgment as to which employees should or
should not be retained . .. [t]he employer's prerogative to make independent,
good faith judgments about employees is important to our free enterprise
system.
Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Em-
ployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1428 (1967).
20. 687 S.W.2d at 735 (Kilgarlin, J., concurring). Justice Kilgarlin commented:
I heartily applaud the court's acknowledgement of the vital need for a public
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. Absolute employment at
will is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up visions of the sweat shops
described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. The doctrine belongs in
a museum, not in our law ....
The court admittedly carves out but one exception to employment at will, but
I do not fault the court for the singleness of its exception .... There was no
need for the court to create any other exception to employment at will in order
to grant Hauck his requested relief. But, our decision today in no way precludes
us from broadening the exception when warranted in a proper case.
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future wages, employee and retirement benefits accrued as though employ-
ment had continued, and punitive damages. 21 This invitation to discharged
employees and their counsel to bring suit is regrettable. Further broadening
of the public policy exception will do nothing but undermine the economic
recovery of Texas by discouraging employers from assessing the state for
expansion or establishment of operational sites. Also, particularly for
smaller companies, a single case can sound the death knell for an employer
incurring difficulty in securing protective insurance coverage.
According to a survey by a San Francisco law firm, in 1986 jury verdicts
in wrongful discharge cases in California averaged $424,527 in general and
punitive damages. 22 In the fifty-one jury verdicts studied, discharged em-
ployees prevailed in seventy-eight percent of the cases. 23 Equally disturbing
is the study by a special committee of the State Bar of California. 24 This
committee, which studied wrongful discharge cases in California from 1980
to 1982, reported that in over fifty percent of the cases in which discharged
employees prevailed, punitive damages were assessed. 25 Damage awards ex-
ceeded $100,000 in seventy-six percent of the cases and $600,000 in thirty-
five percent of the cases. 26 The committee concluded that large and uncer-
tain damage awards would likely add an element of destabilization in the
employer-employee relationship and encourage considerable litigation.27
Such litigation clearly may destroy or seriously weaken many companies.
The possibility of punitive damage recovery by a discharged employee could
be a devastating cost to the employer. 28 As noted by Justice Underwood of
the Illinois Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion in Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc. ,29 such risk could make an employer hesitant about terminating an em-
ployee despite sub-standard performance. 30 Even those companies with the
economic strength to bear a large award of damages will question whether
the advantages of doing business in Texas outweigh the disadvantages. Fur-
ther erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine and the dire financial risks
associated with it will undoubtedly undermine management's ability to man-
age. Employers will shrink from critically evaluating their employees due to
21. Id. at 736. In contrast, reinstatement and back pay are the standard remedies avail-
able for wrongful discharge claims based upon antidiscrimination laws.
22. See 35 DAILY LAB. REP. at A-4 (Feb. 24, 1987) (WESTLAW, Labor Library, Text
and periodicals file).
23. Id.
24. AD-Hoc COMMITTEE ON TERMINATION AT WILL AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE,
EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, To STRIKE A NEW BAL-




28. See A. HILL, supra note 7, at 150; Note, The Development of Exceptions to At-Will
Employment: A Review of the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51 CINN. L. REV. 616,
632-33 (1982).
29. 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
30. 384 N.E.2d at 362. "Henceforth, no matter how indolent, insubordinate, or obnox-
ious an employee may be... [the] employer may thereafter discharge him only at the risk of
being compelled to defend a suit for retaliatory discharge and unlimited punitive dam-
ages .. " Id.
1988]
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the constant threat of litigation.3' The judiciary will monitor the system of
rewards and penalties imposed by the marketplace even though it is ill-
equipped to judge in hindsight the wisdom and justification for personnel
decisions made in an ever-changing business environment.
Perhaps in recognition of the negative impact emanating from further ero-
sion of the employment-at-will doctrine, the appellate courts of Texas, as
well as federal courts applying Texas law, have generally exercised judicial
restraint in wrongful termination cases decided since Sabine Pilot. For ex-
ample, in Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities32 the Dallas court of appeals
reviewed an award of summary judgment in favor of the employer in a
wrongful discharge case. The plaintiff, Berry, was discharged for reporting
to work intoxicated. In addition to denying that he was intoxicated, Berry
suggested that the true motive underlying his discharge was retaliation. On
appeal Berry argued in favor of the applicability of three different exceptions
to the at-will doctrine: (i) that the employee handbook created a contract of
employment; (ii) that he had suffered an intentional tort; and (iii) that a
public policy exception existed. 33
While noting that other jurisdictions had held that employee handbooks
could serve as a contractual limitation on an employer's right to discharge
an employee, the Dallas court cited the Corpus Christi court of appeals's
decision in Reynolds Manufacturing Co. v. Mendoza 34 to the contrary and
rejected Berry's first argument on the grounds that the handbook applicable
to Berry did not circumscribe the employer's ability to discharge him.35 In
support of his intentional tort theory, Berry relied upon the 1978 Waco
court of appeals's decision in K W.S. Manufacturing Co. v. McMahon.36
The Dallas court concluded that this reliance was misplaced due to the fac-
tual peculiarities of K W.S. Manufacturing and the fact that the at-will doc-
trine was simply not at issue in the earlier case. 37 As to the public policy
31. Note, supra note 19, at 229. "Because smaller companies employ fewer people and
because their success often depends upon a few key individuals, these companies will especially
be hurt if their ability to critically evaluate their work force is impaired." Id. at 230.
32. 715 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
33. Id. at 61-62.
34. 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
35. 715 S.W.2d at 61. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the following language
from the handbook:
I UNDERSTAND THAT THIS HANDBOOK IS A GENERAL GUIDE
AND THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS HANDBOOK DO NOT CON-
STITUTE AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (CONTRACT) OR A
GUARANTEE TO CONTINUE EMPLOYMENT.
I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT DOCTORS HOSPITAL
RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS
HANDBOOK AT ANYTIME.
Id. at 61-62. Further, Berry's employment application stated, "I understand and agree that, if
hired, my employment is for no definite period and may, regardless of the date of payment of
my wages and salary, be terminated at any time without any prior notice." Id. at 62.
36. 565 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. 715 S.W.2d at 62. As to this point, the Dallas court concluded that the K. W.S. deci-
sion was not intended to modify sub silentio the employment at-will doctrine. Id. The court
cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's comments on the limited scope of K. W.S. in Phillips v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1056 n.6 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
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exception argument advanced by Berry, the Dallas court held the Texas
Supreme Court to its word that Sabine Pilot was a narrow exception to the
at-will doctrine. The Dallas court noted that Sabine Pilot merely proscribed
an employer from forcing an employee to choose between discharge from his
livelihood or criminal liability. 38 Thus, the Dallas court declined Justice
Kilgarlin's implied invitation to erode further the at-will doctrine.
In Webber v. M W. Kellogg Co.39 and in Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast,
Inc. 40 the Houston and Beaumont courts of appeals, respectively, declined to
accept arguments advanced in favor of limiting or circumventing the at-will
rule. In Webber the fundamental issue was the existence of a written con-
tract of employment limiting the right to terminate.41 In concluding that
there was no such written contract, the court rejected Webber's reliance
upon documentation categorizing his employment as permanent and show-
ing his normal retirement date to be February 1, 1999. The court held that a
form classifying Webber as a permanent employee, as opposed to a tempo-
rary employee, did not constitute a promise of lifetime employment. 42 Like-
wise, the court refused to classify the insertion of the normal retirement date
on Webber's retirement plan papers as a promise of employment until that
date.43 As to the latter document, the court noted that Webber was not even
a member of the retirement system at the time these retirement plan papers
were created.44 The court further observed that booklets and brochures en-
couraging a career with the company did not limit the employer's right to
terminate the employee. 45 Thus, the court continued that absent a written
employment contract limiting termination rights, either party was at liberty
to terminate the relationship at will.46 The court concluded that the require-
ment of the statute of frauds, that contracts not to be completed within one
year are not enforceable unless in writing, was not satisfied.47 Finally, the
court also held the statute of frauds to be applicable to the fraud claim ad-
vanced by Webber. 48
In concert with the Houston court's comments in Webber, the Beaumont
court in Benoit set forth the elements of the wrongful discharge cause of
38. 715 S.W.2d at 62.
39. 720 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. 728 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. 720 S.W.2d at 125.





47. Id. As to the statute of frauds issue, it should be noted that Webber was alleging the
existence of an agreement promising lifetime employment, as opposed to a term of employment
of less than one year.
48. The court noted:
Since plaintiff is here seeking to recover what he would have gained had the
[oral employment] promise been performed, it is apparent that his action, while
cast in language sounding in tort, is an indirect attempt to recover for the breach
of the unenforceable promise and is, therefore, barred by the statute of frauds.
Id. at 129 (citing Collins v. McCombs, 511 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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action as follows: first, that a contract existed between the employee and his
employer that specifically provided and directly limited the employer's right
to terminate the contract at will; and, second, that this employment contract
was in writing.49 The court further emphasized that the written contract
must, "in a meaningful and special way," specify that the employer may not
terminate the employment at will.50
Benoit argued that due to the successful completion of his probationary
period his employment was "permanent" and would continue until he
reached the retirement age of sixty-five. He also argued that the employee
handbook and policies, which were written, amounted to an agreement or
contract in writing that limited Polysar from terminating Benoit at will. The
court rejected both arguments. As to the alleged permanent employee sta-
tus, the court held that Benoit failed to satisfy his burden of proving the
existence of a written contract promising lifetime employment. 5I While rec-
ognizing that the employee handbook and written policies encouraged regu-
lar attendance and set forth a progressive discipline scheme, the court
concluded that such writings did not constitute a written employment con-
tract that limited Polysar's right to terminate its employee at will.52 The
fraud allegations advanced by Benoit were rejected based upon the statute of
frauds, since the injuries and damage claimed were due to an alleged con-
tract of employment that was not in writing.5 3
The courts in both Webber and Benoit also addressed the arguments ad-
vanced in favor of the employees' promissory estoppel claims. In both cases,
the courts noted that reliance upon a claim of promissory estoppel to appli-
cation of the statute of frauds required proof that either the employer prom-
ised to reduce the oral employment agreement to writing or the employer
misrepresented to the employee that a writing, such as the handbook, com-
plied with the statute of frauds.54 Neither requirement was satisfied in either
case.
Relying upon a consistent line of Texas decisions, 55 the Fifth Circuit in
Joachim v. A T& T Information Systems 56 upheld summary judgment for em-
ployer AT&T against an employee's claim that the company's employee
handbook created contractual employment rights that precluded application
of the Texas employment-at-will provisions.5 7 In rejecting this argument,
49. Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. Id. (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 407.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 408.
54. Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 407.
55. Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986,
no writ) (employee handbook was not an express agreement altering at-will employment); Val-
lone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (employee handbook did not create contractual employment rights); Reynolds
Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (em-
ployee handbooks are not express agreements on employment discharge procedures).
56. 793 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986).
57. Id. at 114.
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the court noted that under Texas law employee handbooks did not create a
contractual agreement and absent express reciprocal agreements on proce-
dures for discharge, employee handbooks were only general guidelines.5 8
Both a contractual right in favor of the employee and a concomitant obliga-
tion on the employer are required if the at-will rule is to be avoided. 59
Over the vigorous dissent of Judge Edith Hollan Jones, a panel of the
Fifth Circuit in Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc. 60 virtually ignored Joachim
and upheld jury findings that employee Aiello was working under both an
express contract and an implied contract and that she had been discharged
without just cause.61 Both the express and the implied contracts derived
from the employer's handbook, which contained the provision that employ-
ees would be discharged only for just cause.62 Straining to reach a conclu-
sion supportive of the jury's findings, the panel's majority rejected any
controlling effect to be accorded the handbook's statement disavowing the
creation of a contract from the handbook's regulations and policies.63 With-
out citing any supporting authority, the majority opinion stated as a legal
truism that such disavowals are not controlling."4 The panel majority em-
phasized the significance of the detailed procedures for discipline and dis-
charge contained within the handbook, 65 which two former supervisors
testified they considered to be contracts and to impliedly prohibit discrimi-
natory disciplines. 66
Of greatest concern to employers is the court's statement, based upon two
Texas appellate court decisions involving alleged oral agreements between
employees and their supervisors, that under Texas law an employee manual
with specific disciplinary procedures can constitute an express written con-
tract.67 In her dissent, Judge Jones looked beyond concerns about the sum-
mary rejection of any import to be attached to the handbook's disclaimer
and the specific admonition contained therein affirming that employment is
at will, and concerns over the panel majority's adroit side-stepping of statute
of frauds issues. Her comments focused critically on the lack of similarity
between the cited cases involving express oral contracts and the case at
bar.68
58. Id. (citing Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1982, no writ).
59. Id.
60. 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987).
61. Id. at 1201.
62. Id. at 1198.
63. Such regulations and policies "are not intended to be, and do not constitute, a con-
tractual arrangement or agreement between the company and its employees of any kind...
that all employment is 'at will.'" Id. at 1198, 1200.
64. Id. at 1200. This action may be attributable, at least in part, to the employer's pretrial
stipulation that "its 'personnel policies' prohibited it from discharging an employee without
good cause." Id. at 1198-99.
65. Id. at 1201.
66. Id. at 1198.
67. Id. at 1198-99 (citing United Transp. Union v. Brown, 694 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
68. Judge Jones noted:
1988]
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The decision in Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. 69 has significance apart from
the reliance placed upon it by the Fifth Circuit in Aiello. Johnson involved a
summary dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. 70 Accordingly, as
with summary judgment cases generally, the court effectively sought
grounds upon which to avoid affirmance. 71 Toward this end, the Eastland
court concluded that an employee may avoid the at-will rule when a supervi-
sor with authority to do so has entered into an oral agreement with that
employee under which termination will only be for cause.72
Indirect challenges to the employment-at-will doctrine have also surfaced
in wrongful discharge litigation founded upon a claimed violation of the
Texas Constitution and in defamation suits. In Jones v. Memorial Hospital
System 73 summary judgment in favor of the employer was reversed because
it may have violated the employee's freedom of speech rights under the fed-
eral and state constitutions.74 Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck 75 clearly identi-
fies the potential for defamation claims based upon statements or writings
made in the context of events surrounding an employee's discharge.76 Fur-
ther, in Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co. 77 the court held that the publication
element of a defamation cause of action could be satisfied by statements
made to the employee by a general foreman in the presence of the employee's
immediate supervisor. 78 Defamation cases have even been advanced based
upon a theory of self-publication under which employees alleged that in ap-
plying for new employment they had to repeat defamatory statements made
by their previous employer.79
I cannot find any similarity between the cases cited by the majority, which in-
volved express oral contracts, and the present case, which glaringly lacks an
express promise to Mrs. Aiello. Moreover, unlike the majority, I find no Texas
authority which countenances an "implied" employment contract as an excep-
tion to the at-will doctrine. To so hold creates a probably fatal breach in the
wall Texas has erected in favor of employers.
818 F.2d at 1204. The obvious incongruity between Aiello and Joachim, which Judge Jones
highlighted, id. at 1203, has also been noted by Federal District Judge George Kazen who
stated: It is frankly difficult to reconcile Aiello with Joachim v. AT&T Information Systems
.... Indeed it is difficult to harmonize Aiello with other Texas cases cited by Judge Jones
.... .Ramos v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., No. L-85-85 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1987).
69. 690 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 90-91.
72. Id. at 93. Since such an oral agreement might be performable within one year, it has
been held that the statute of frauds is thereby avoided. Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709
S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. 677 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
74. Id. at 226.
75. 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985).
76. 678 S.W.2d at 630.
77. 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). As to the wrongful discharge
claim itself, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the employer, noting that a
fact issue existed regarding whether or not Ramos was employed under an oral or written
agreement whereby he would not be terminated except for good cause. Id. at 336-37.
78. Id. at 334.
79. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (it was foreseeable that prospective employers would ask discharged
employees why they had been terminated); Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439
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B. Statutory Exceptions-Antidiscrimination Laws
1. Texas Commission on Human Rights Act
The purposes of the Commission on Human Rights Act (the CHR Act)80
are to provide for the execution of policies embodied in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,81 to create an authority that meets its criteria, 82 and to
protect persons in this state from discrimination in employment.8 3 Gener-
ally, the CHR Act makes discrimination an unlawful employment prac-
tice.84 Of significance to many employers, the definition of handicap
excludes addiction to any drug or illegal or federally controlled substances
or to alcohol.85 Therefore, drug and alcohol addicts may not look to the
CHR Act for protection from employment discrimination.8 6
The CHR Act also creates the Commission on Human Rights (TCHR)
which is similar to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in its purpose and its procedures.87 The TCHR has broad authority
to enforce the CHR Act.88 The CHR Act also permits political subdivisions
to create a local commission to perform generally the same functions89 when
the EEOC or TCHR either refers the complaint to the local commission or
defers jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint to the local com-
mission.90 The TCHR is subject to the Texas Sunset Act9' and will be abol-
ished September 1, 1989, unless continued in existence as provided by the
Sunset Act.92
If a person believes he or she is the victim of an unlawful employment
practice, that person must file a charge of discrimination within 180 days
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reasonable expectation that defamed person
would communicate defamatory matter to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (when one communicates defamatory
words to the defamed person under circumstances in which communication to a third person
is likely, there is publication).
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987).
81. Id § 1.02(1).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 1.02(2).
84. It is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual or
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color, handicap, religion, sex, national
origin, or age." Id. § 5.01(1). Sections 5.01-. 10 outline the discrimination in employment pro-
hibited by the Act. Id. §§ 5.01-. 10.
85. Id. § 2.01(7)(B). The federal definition of "individual with handicaps" does not in-
clude any individual who is an alcoholic or a drug user whose current use of alcohol or drugs
prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employ-
ment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a threat to property or
the safety of others. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.S. § 706(8)(B) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1987).
86. Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 149, 150 (Dec. 16, 1987).
87. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 3.01-.03 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1988).
88. The commission is empowered "to receive, investigate, seek to conciliate, and pass on
complaints alleging violations of [the] Act and file civil actions to effectuate the purposes of
this Act." Id. § 3.02(6).
89. Id. §§ 4.02-.04.
90. Id. § 4.03(5).
91. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 325.001-.024 (Vernon 1988).
92. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 3.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 93 Texas
has entered into a "Worksharing Agreement" 94 with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to facilitate the handling of charges of discrimina-
tion. Title VII also provides that a charge of discrimination must be filed
within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 95
Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit in Mennor v. Fort Hood National
Bank 96 a person in Texas may have the benefit of a 300-day filing period.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Mennor in Urrutia v. Valero Energy
Corp. ,97 which raised the same issue. In Urrutia, the district court dismissed
the plaintiff's claim against Valero because he did not file his charge of dis-
crimination within 180 days of his termination; however, the Fifth Circuit
reversed and held that under Mennor the 300-day period for filing with the
EEOC is available whether or not proceedings are timely instituted under
state or local law.98
a. Poor Vision is Not a Handicap
Adopting a very restrictive definition of "handicap," the Texas Supreme
Court recently held that as a matter of law a person with poor vision is not a
handicapped person.99 Sheila Redmon sued Gulf Corporation (now Chev-
ron Corporation) because Gulf refused to hire her as a maintenance helper
or laborer. Carter's pre-employment physical exam detected vision
problems that were not entirely correctible. Gulf therefore disqualified
Carter from further consideration solely because of her vision. Gulf moved
for summary judgment on the basis that Carter was not a handicapped per-
son as defined in the CHR Act. The trial court agreed and granted Gulf's
motion. The court of appeals reversed and held that article 5221k did not
require a determination of whether a person is handicapped but only a deter-
mination of whether an employer refused to hire a person because of
handicap. 100
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the sum-
93. Id. § 6.01.
94. Worksharing Agreements are authorized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to facilitate the handling of charges filed in states (such as Texas) having agencies authorized
to investigate them. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) (1982). Title VII specifically empowers the
EEOC "to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other
agencies .. " Id.
95. [I]n a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the per-
son aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency
with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall
be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after
receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings
under the State or local law, whichever is earlier....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
96. 829 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1987).
97. Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., No. 87-5548 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 1988).
98. Id., slip op. at 4.
99. Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 149 (Dec. 16, 1987).
100. Carter v. Gulf Oil Corp., 699 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
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mary judgment in favor of Gulf.10 1 The court held that the court of ap-
peals's interpretation of the CHR Act was too narrow and ignored its
provisions defining handicap and handicapped person.10 2 The court ob-
served that the legislature included these definitions in article 5221k for a
reason and did not include meaningless provisions. 0 3 The court of appeals's
conclusion, therefore, that article 5221k does not require a determination of
whether Redmon was a handicapped person was wrong. The statute re-
quires only a determination of whether Redmon was denied employment
because of a handicap.1o4
Comparing the present action with a plaintiff's burden in Title VII and
age discrimination actions, the court stated that before she could recover,
Redmon must first establish that she is a member of the class sought to be
protected by article 5221k. 10 5 Specifically, the Court held that Remond
must establish that she is a handicapped person. 10 6 Because article 5221k's
definitions of handicap and handicapped person do not detail what is in-
cluded within the terms, the court examined the CHR Act, its predecessor
acts, and the legislative history of those acts to determine what the Act was
intended to cover. 10 7 The previous act, the Texas Human Resources
Code, 10 8 was concerned with physical and mental defects that were serious
enough to affect a person's ability to use common carriers and public facili-
ties, to obtain housing, and to cross the street. 10 9 The court observed that
the entire act was designed to protect persons impaired to the point of inabil-
ity from participating in the social or economic life of the state, to achieve
independence, or to become gainfully employed without this protection."10
The court concluded that the legislature was not focusing upon minor physi-
cal or mental defects. I"' The court also analyzed the predecessor statute to
the Texas Human Resources Code. 1 2 The employment discrimination pro-
vision 13 contrasted the term "handicapped" with the term "able-bodied,"
which, the court held, revealed that the legislature was concerned with seri-
ous impairments."14
The court also noted that the sponsor of the CHR Act urged the legisla-
ture not to limit or damage the handicap law already in place.I 5 The court
construed the sponsor's comments to mean that the legislature did not in-
101. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 149.
102. Id.





108. TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 121.001-.010 (Vernon 1980).
109. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 151.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e (Vernon 1976).
113. Id. art. 4419e, § 3(g).




tend article 5221k to change the law concerning handicapped persons.1 6
The court further observed that the legislature did not use the definition of
handicap in the federal Rehabilitation Act,1 17 and the court declined to em-
ploy that definition." 8
The Texas Supreme Court chose to rely upon decisions of other states that
have addressed the issue of interpreting the term "handicap."' ' 9 Relying
upon those decisions, the court concluded that in order for a disability to be
considered a handicap, "it must be one which is generally perceived as se-
verely limiting him in performing work-related functions in general.' 20
Turning to Redmon's claim, the court held that her minor visual problems
were not a severe enough impediment to employment or other life functions
as to require protection by the state.12' The court observed that any other
conclusion would elevate into a handicap every characteristic an employer
might use to make employment decisions.' 22 Finally, the Court noted that
unless they unlawfully discriminate against a protected group, employers
should have the right to make certain employment decisions.' 23
b. Aids as a Handicap
On March 19, 1987, the Attorney General of Texas, Jim Mattox, issued
an opinion clarifying the definition of "handicapped person" under the
Texas CHR Act.' 24 The opinion cited the recent United States Supreme
Court decision, School Board v. Arline, 25 for the proposition that chronic
illnesses and contagious diseases, including AIDS, will likely be treated as
handicaps for purposes of the handicapped discrimination prohibition within
the CHR Act. Thus, the opinion indicates that the CHR Act will be inter-
preted to prohibit discrimination with respect to hiring or termination deci-
sions involving AIDS carriers.
2. Article 8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted to benefit and protect em-
ployees and is liberally construed in favor of workers. 126 Recently, the
Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the Act, specifically article 8307c, in
two important respects. First, the supreme court established that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not preempt the Workers' Com-
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796).
118. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 151.
119. Id. (citing with approval Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Pa. Commw.
212, 448 A.2d 701 (1982); Advocates for Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 Il1. App.
3d 512, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); Chicago, M., St. P.&P. R.R.
v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 392, 215 N.W.2d 443 (1974)).
120. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 151-52.
121. Id. at 152.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987).
125. 107 S. Ct. 1913, 95 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1987).
126. See Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1955);
Hargrove v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 152 Tex. 243, 246, 256 S.W.2d 73, 75 (1953).
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pensation Act. 127 Second, the supreme court held that punitive damages are
available for retaliatory discharges brought under article 8307c.
In Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co. 128 the Texas Supreme Court established that
an employee's cause of action for wrongful discharge pursuant to article
8307c of the Workers' Compensation Act 129 is not preempted by the NLRA.
In Ruiz Amalia Ruiz was discharged from her job at Miller Curtain Com-
pany after she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. She subse-
quently filed suit against Miller Curtain for retaliatory discharge under
article 8307c. Ruiz was not a member of a labor union while employed at
Miller Curtain. Additionally, neither Miller Curtain nor its employees were
subject to any kind of collective bargaining agreement. The trial court dis-
missed Ruiz's claim for want of jurisdiction, holding that her article 8307c
cause of action was preempted by the NLRA. 130 The court of appeals
affirmed.1 31
In determining whether the NLRA preempted article 8307c, the Texas
Supreme Court noted that state regulations may be sustained only when reg-
ulated conduct is peripheral to the federal law or concerns deeply rooted
local interests.1 32 Thus, the court observed, that before article 8307c could
be preempted, it must at least be protected arguably by the NLRA.1 33
Noting that sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA134 protect a worker's right to
engage in self-organization, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid and protection, the court observed that Ruiz was not in a labor union
and there was no collective bargaining agreement. 35 According to the
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
128. 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1985).
129. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1987).
130. 702 S.W.2d at 184.
131. 686 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), rev'd, 702 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Tex. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3295 (1986).
132. 702 S.W.2d at 185 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959)).
133. Id.
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1982).
135. 702 S.W.2d at 185. In Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980), Carna-
tion discharged Borner two days after the employee settled his workers' compensation claim
with Carnation. After his discharge, Borner's union filed a grievance on his behalf, but ulti-
mately did not pursue it. Borner then filed his lawsuit for wrongful discharge under article
8307c. Carnation contended that Borner's filing of a grievance pursuant to the collective bar-
gaining agreement precluded his article 8307c suit. The court held that because the arbitration
procedure was not invoked by the union and no final and binding arbitration decision was
obtained, Borner's article 8307c claim was not precluded. Id. at 453. In Bonner v. Fleming
Cos., 734 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ requested), the court addressed
whether the plaintiff was precluded from bringing his wrongful discharge suit pursuant to
article 8307c by his failure to pursue the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the union and his employer. The court held that the employee was
not precluded from pursuing his article 8307c wrongful discharge suit because of a grievance
procedure contained in a collective bargaining agreement, unless there had previously been a
final settlement of the dispute pursuant to the agreement. In Crocker v. Synpol, Inc., 732
S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ dism'd by agr.), however, the court held that
the union employee's wrongful discharge suit (not based upon article 8307c), whether de-
scribed as one in contract or tort, was dependent upon an interpretation of the collective bar-
19881
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court, merely filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits did not con-
stitute the type of concerted activity contemplated by the NLRA.1 36
The Texas Supreme Court also concluded that the action taken by Ruiz
that the state protects was not subject to the NLRA.1 37 Finding that noth-
ing in the NLRA or other federal legislation indicated that Congress in-
tended to take away the states' tenth amendment power to regulate workers'
compensation, the court observed that article 8307c was designed to further
the workers' compensation system and touched interests deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility.1 38
Recognizing that the primary purpose of the NLRA was to promote the
organization of unions and to provide unions with a free atmosphere within
which employees may organize and bargain collectively, 139 the court noted
that the conduct regulated by article 8307c was not a peripheral concern of
the NLRA because little likelihood existed that article 8307c would interfere
with the activities of the NLRA. 14° Thus, the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and held that Ruiz could pursue her article 8307c claim. 14 1
In Azar Nut Co. v. Caille 14 2 Loretta Caille, aged sixty-three, was injured
when a file cabinet tipped over, causing a flower pot to strike her on the
head. A few days later, Caille began to have ringing in her ears and to suffer
from vertigo and headaches, none of which she had experienced before the
accident. When Caille filed a report about her problems, her supervisor re-
wrote the report and deleted the references to her injuries.
Company employees prepared Caille's first report of injury, which men-
tioned only a cut on her hand and not any other injuries. Caille then went to
an audiologist who discovered that she had a severe right ear impairment.
When Caille submitted a supplement to her first report of injury detailing
the circumstances of her ear injury, the company's clerk refused to sign it.
The clerk then reported to the secretary of the company's president that
Caille had falsely reported her ear injury. After Caille filed a notice of claim
with the Industrial Accident Board, her supervisor threw her file on her desk
and demanded an explanation. Caille tried to explain her situation to the
company's president and vice-president, but they refused to see her or review
her medical reports. Three weeks later, Caille was discharged. Upon trial of
gaining agreement between his employer and the union; therefore, the claim was preempted by
federal labor law.
136. 702 S.W.2d at 185 (citing Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1980)).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 185-86. Quoting the Supreme Court of Hawaii, the court stated that "[t]he state
has substantial interest in the welfare of workers who are injured in the course of their employ-
ment and to see that they are not penalized for pursuing remedies granted to them by statute."
Id. at 186 (citing Puchert v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449 (Haw. 1984), appeal dism'd sub nom. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985)).
139. Id. at 185 (citing Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 1981)).
140. 702 S.W.2d at 185.
141. Recently, in Luna v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 726 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1987, no writ), the court of appeals held that a cause of action under article 8307c is governed
by the two-year statute of limitations.
142. 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
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Caille's retaliatory discharge claim, the jury awarded $167,464 for lost wages
and insurance benefits. The jury also found that Azar had acted willfully
and maliciously in discharging Caille and awarded $175,000 in punitive
damages.143 The court of appeals affirmed.144 The Texas Supreme Court
agreed and held that punitive damages are available under article 8307c of
the Workers' Compensation Act. 45
The Texas Supreme Court examined the legislative history of article 8307c
and concluded that the legislature intended to include punitive damages
within the statutory phrase "reasonable damages."' 46 Citing Webster's defi-
nition of "reasonable," the court suggested that this word referred to the
amount of damages recoverable. 147 Therefore, the court held that the legis-
lature did not intend to exclude an entire class of damages normally avail-
able under Texas law by interpreting "reasonable" to exclude punitive
damages.' 48 The court also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, 49 which, in analyzing a statutory provision identical to article
8307c, held that exemplary damages could be awarded in some cases of re-
taliatory discharge. ' 50 The court agreed with the reasoning of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and held that the threat of punitive damages would certainly
143. Id. at 668.
144. 720 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1986).
145. 734 S.W.2d at 668. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissenting opinions cited the
court's previous decision in Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980). In Carna-
tion one issue before the court was whether future damages were recoverable under article
8307c. Id. at 454. The court held that under article 8307c "reasonable certainty as to the
amount of damages is required" and, therefore, "loss of wages in the future, retirement and
other benefits which are ascertainable with reasonable certainty and are the result of wrongful
discharge" are recoverable. Id. (emphasis added). Although Borner recovered exemplary
damages, the court did not specifically address the recoverability of exemplary damages under
article 8307c. The court affirmed the award of exemplary damages because "there was no
objection to the definition of 'exemplary damages,' [submitted to the jury] which included the
element of 'inconvenience and mental anguish,'" which damages, the court held, were recov-
erable. Id. at 454-55.
146. The court observed that the original legislation, House Bill 113, "provided that an
employer who violates § 8307c 'shall be liable for damages suffered by an employee' "; that
upon the second reading of the bill, the language was changed to "loss of earnings suffered";
and that the conference committee amended the bill to read "reasonable damages." 734
S.W.2d at 668. As there was no emphasis on the word "suffered" in the final version of the
statute, the argument involved the type of damages. Id. Thus, the court deduced, the question
was whether by adding the word "reasonable," the legislature intended to preclude punitive
damages. Id. at 669. According to the court, "reasonable" is defined as "not immoderate; not
excessive; not unjust, tolerable; moderate; sensible; sane." Id. at 669 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW
TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1502 (2d ed. 1975)).
147. 734 S.W.2d at 669.
148. Id.
149. Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519 (Okla. 1985). The dissenters dis-
agreed that Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. was instructive and distinguished the case.
734 S.W.2d at 670 (Spears, J., dissenting, joined by Hill, C.J., and Campbell, J.).
150. 697 P.2d at 523. The Oklahoma court stated:
We deem it proper and necessary that exemplary damages be assessed against an
employer under appropriate circumstances in strict conformity with the purpose
therefor, to prevent the practice [of retaliatory discharge]. In the absence of the
deterent [sic] effect of punitive damages, there would be little to dissuade an




deter bad faith termination of employees and was therefore consistent with
article 8307c.151
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
In Texas a covenant not to compete is generally an agreement between an
employer and an employee that sets forth temporal and territorial restraints
on an employee's future competition with a former employer.15 2 Under the
common law of contracts, a covenant not to compete is a restraint of trade,
and its terms are enforceable only if reasonable in other respects. 1 53 Prior to
Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc.,154 whether a covenant not to compete was
enforceable was essentially determined by balancing the interests of the re-
strained and the protected parties.15 5 Changing well established law, Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. now requires that a covenant not to compete must
meet four broad criteria in order to be deemed reasonable by the court:' 56
(1) the covenant must be necessary for the protection of the promisee; (2) the
covenant must not be oppressive to the promisor; (3) the covenant must not
be injurious to the public; and (4) the promisee must give consideration for
something of value.157 In addition to meeting the four criteria, if the pur-
pose of a covenant not to compete is primarily to limit competition, or if it
restrains the right to engage in a common calling, then it will be held
unenforceable. 158
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. sought to enjoin Joel Hill, a former franchisee,
from competing with it in a seven-county area in violation of a covenant not
to compete. The trial court granted the injunction, and the court of appeals
affirmed with one justice dissenting.' 59 On application for writ of error, Hill
complained that the covenant not to compete was a restraint on trade and
was unreasonable. 160
The facts reflected that Mobile Auto Trim sold car trim franchises in
which the franchisee would drive an equipped van to car dealerships and
make repairs at the dealership's premises. Hill purchased a franchise, which
included within its territory a large part of Dallas County and all of Denton
County, in August 1982 for approximately $42,000. In addition, Hill was to
pay five percent of his gross revenues to Mobile Auto Trim. The franchise
151. 734 S.W.2d at 669.
152. Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 312, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951
(1960).
153. Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1987).
154. Id. at 168.
155. Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp. of Texas, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ requested). "[I]f [the covenant] is greater than is required for
the protection of the person for whose benefit the restraint is imposed or imposes undue hard-
ship upon the person restricted," then the covenant will not be enforceable. Weatherford, 161
Tex. at 312, 340 S.W.2d at 951.
156. Whether a covenant not to compete is reasonable is a question of law for the court.
Hill, 725 S.W.2d at 170 (citing Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983)).
157. Id. at 170-71.
158. Id. at 172 (citing Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982)).
159. 704 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985).
160. 725 S.W.2d at 172.
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agreement contained a covenant not to compete. The covenant provided
that upon termination of the franchise agreement Hill would not compete
with Mobile Auto Trim and would not contact managers of the car dealer-
ships in a seven-county area, including Dallas and Denton Counties, for a
period of three years.
Hill, as Mobile Auto Trim's franchisee, contacted car dealerships and
made car trim repairs for two and one-half years. Thereafter, Hill failed to
pay his franchise fees for several months, and Mobil Auto Trim terminated
the franchise agreement. On the same day of his discharge, Hill contacted a
prior customer in violation of the covenant not to compete.
In analyzing the covenant not to compete, the Texas Supreme Court ob-
served that there are generally two types of covenants, those specifying that
the seller of a business will not compete with the buyer 16' and those specify-
ing that a discharged employee will not compete with the former em-
ployer.162 Observing that the covenant was neither a covenant incident to
the sale of a business nor a post-employment covenant not to compete,163 the
supreme court analyzed Hill's covenant under the four criteria.
First, the court held that before a promisee may claim that the covenant is
necessary for his protection, the promisee must demonstrate a legitimate in-
terest in preserving business goodwill or trade secrets.164 Although Mobile
Auto Trim alleged that its trim services were trade secrets, it did not provide
any evidence of that fact, nor did it bring suit to stop use of its trade
secrets.' 65 Apparently, Mobile Auto Trim was willing to allow Hill to use
its trade secrets anywhere but in the seven-county area.' 66 The court also
observed that it could find no legitimate business interest 67 of Mobile Auto
Trim that the covenant was necessary to protect. 68 The purpose of the cov-
enant, the court held, was to prevent Hill from exploiting the contacts and
the goodwill that existed between Mobile Auto Trim and the managers of
the car dealerships. 69 The court noted, however, the existence not only of
Mobile Auto Trim's business goodwill, but of Hill's franchisee goodwill, and
that it would be Hill's type of goodwill that would render him capable of
retaining clients or customers.' 70 The court apparently believed that em-
161. Id. at 170 (citing Daniel v. Goesl, 161 Tex. 490, 341 S.W.2d 892 (1960)).
162. 725 S.W.2d at 170 (citing Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1973)).
163. 725 S.W.2d at 171; see M.R.S. Datascope Inc. v. Exchange Data Corp., No. 01-87-
0401-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 8, 1987, no writ) (court upheld covenant that
was incident to the sale of a business); Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp., Inc., 739 S.W.2d
460, 464 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ requested) (court upheld covenant that was inci-
dent to the sale of a business).
164. 725 S.W.2d at 170-71. In Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636, 639-40 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), the court of appeals suggested that in applying the
Hill criteria, a court may balance the equities to determine whether the necessity for protection
of the promisee outweighs the possibility that the covenant is oppressive to the promisor.
165. 725 S.W.2d at 171.
166. Id.
167. "Legitimate business interest" apparently refers to business goodwill.





ployees/franchisees should not, by virtue of a restrictive covenant, be de-
prived of the goodwill that they have generated, as opposed to the goodwill
of the business generally. Noting that when capable individuals leave a busi-
ness they are able to take many clients with them, the court observed that
these fruits of the employee's goodwill are what employers and franchisors
attempt to deny the employee/franchisee by requiring that he enter into a
covenant not to compete.
1 7
'
Second, the court held that a covenant not to compete must not be oppres-
sive to the promisor.172 Specifically, the covenant limitations as to time, ter-
ritory, and activity must be reasonable.173 The court held that the covenant
was oppressive for several reasons. First, the covenant placed Hill in a posi-
tion of not being able to compete with Mobile Auto Trim, thereby neutraliz-
ing Hill's personal goodwill.' 74 Second, as a result of the termination of the
franchise agreement, Hill lost his franchise and his investment. 75 Third, the
covenant prevented Hill from using his previously acquired skills and tal-
ent 176 to support his family in the county of their residence. 177 Barring Hill
from using his previously acquired skills in the future appeared to cause the
court great concern. Recognizing that a man's talents are his own, the court
held that clear and convincing proof would be required to overcome the
presumption that a man has not agreed to restrict the future use of such
talents. 178
Third, the covenant must not be injurious to the public by preventing
competition and depriving the community of needed goods.' 79 The court
observed that even if the covenant's time, area, and scope provisions are
reasonable, the covenant may still prohibit fair competition. 80 The court
concluded that while fair competition might be harmful to a franchisor, it
must still be allowed as a normal effect of a free market economy.' 8 '
Fourth, the covenant not to compete will only be enforced if the promisee
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Frankiewicz v. National Comp. Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982);
Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. 1973); and Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v.
Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 312, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960)); see M.R.S. Datascope Inc. v. Ex-
change Data Corp., 745 S.W.2d 542, 545-46 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ)
(covenant enforced because promisor voluntarily and knowingly gave up her right to compete
in medical record services business for a limited time when she sold her business to her em-
ployer and signed covenant not to compete).
174. 725 S.W.2d at 172.
175. Id. It is unclear why the covenant is oppressive simply because the termination of the
franchise agreement resulted in Hill losing his franchise and his investment. The loss of the
franchise seems totally unrelated to the issue of the oppressiveness of the covenant.
176. The record reflected that Hill obtained his skills as an auto trim repairman prior to
entering into a franchise agreement with Mobile Auto Trim. Id. at 171.
177. Id. at 172.
178. Id. If, for example, the only hardship to an employee engaged in sales is that he may
be required to find temporary employment in a different area of sales, then there is no undue
hardship. Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.]
1987, no writ).
179. 725 S.W.2d at 171.




gives something of value.' 82 With respect to general types of covenants, the
court held that this fourth criterion promotes economic efficiency.183 When
a covenant is incident to the sale of a business, the covenant of the seller not
to compete with the buyer increases the value of the business to the buyer
and increases the attractiveness of buying the business. 184 When a covenant
involves employer-employee situations, the special training or knowledge ac-
quired by the employee through his employer is valuable consideration and
often enhances the value of the employee to other businesses.' 85 The court
found that the franchisor-franchisee situation did not fall within either of
these categories of consideration.' 8 6 Thus, there was an absence of consider-
ation on the part of Mobile Auto Trim because Hill already had training and
knowledge and because Mobile Auto Trim certainly made no promise not to
compete with Hill upon termination of their franchise agreement.'
8 7
Quoting the Utah Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a
new standard whereby noncompetition covenants intended to limit competi-
tion or restrain activity in a common calling are not enforceable' 88 and are
void as against public policy.' 89 It is clear that if a covenant not to compete
does not meet the four criteria then it is void. Under the court's new stan-
dard, however, a covenant is void if it is primarily designed to limit competi-
tion or if it restrains the right to engage in a common calling.
Subsequent to Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., the supreme court con-
fronted the issue of whether a covenant not to compete that restrains the
right to engage in a common calling is void. In Bergman v. Norris of Hous-
ton 190 the employee barbers had signed covenants not to compete. Upon
their resignation, the employees began their own hair styling business, and
their former employer sought to enjoin them from violating the covenant not
to compete. The trial court granted the injunction and the court of appeals
affirmed. 191
The Texas Supreme Court did not review the covenant pursuant to the
four criteria outlined in Hill. Rather, the court simply held that if the em-
ployees were engaged in a common calling, then the covenant was unen-
182. Id. at 171.
183. Id.
184. Id.; see M.R.S. Datascope Inc. v. Exchange Data Corp., 745 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (covenant incident to sale of business increased value of
business).
185. 725 S.W.2d at 171. Special employee training is valuable consideration, often enhanc-
ing the value of the employee to prospective employers. Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d
636, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). As the court of appeals recognized,
"[tio allow employees to use this training or knowledge upon leaving an employer would cre-
ate a disincentive for employers to train or educate employees." Id.
186. 725 S.W.2d at 171.
187. Id.
188. "Covenants not to compete which are primarily designed to limit competition or re-
strain the right to engage in a common calling are not enforceable." Id. at 172 (quoting Rob-
bins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982)).
189. Id.
190. 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987).
191. Id. at 673-74.
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forceable. 192 The court added that whether an employee is engaged in a
common calling is a question of law to be decided from the facts of each
individual case.193 Without discussion of the factual basis for the decision,
the court concluded that barbering is a common calling; therefore, the cove-
nant was held unenforceable.1 94 Unfortunately, the court did not provide
guidelines for the lower courts or practitioners to assist them in determining
whether an employee is engaged in a common calling.
195
IV. DRUG TESTING, POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS,
AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
A. Drug Testing in the Workplace
In a recent case arising in Travis County, a district court found that an
employer's mandatory drug testing policy was lawful and enforceable under
the laws of this state. 196 In Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc. 197
Brenda Jennings brought a lawsuit against her employer, Minco Technology
Labs, Inc., challenging the legality of Minco's mandatory urinalysis testing
program. Jennings specifically sought injunctive relief and a declaratory
judgment that the drug testing program: (1) violated her common law right
to privacy; (2) violated her right to be free from an unlawful search and
seizure; (3) arbitrarily and irrationally denied her "legal and contractual 9"
expectation of continued employment;" and (4) impermissibly created a pre-
sumption of guilt against her. 199 Minco generally denied the allegations,
specially excepted to many of the allegations, and counterclaimed for declar-
atory relief on the ground that its testing policy did not violate any Texas
laws. After trial on the issues of declaratory and injunctive relief, Judge
Hart issued a detailed letter opinion 2°° outlining the bases for his decision.
Jennings argued that the employment-at-will issue was irrelevant to the
resolution of her claims. 20 The court disagreed and stated that the issue
was whether Jennings would have a cause of action for wrongful discharge if
she were discharged for refusing to submit to urinalysis. 20 2 Thus, the court
192. Id. at 674.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d at 176 (failure of court to adopt a
definition of common calling will result in costly litigation) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting, joined by
Hill, C.J., and Campbell, J.).
196. Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc., No. 409, 151 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County,
53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Nov. 9, 1987). As of this writing, Jennings has taken the steps
necessary to appeal the judgment to the court of appeals.
197. Id.
198. In his letter opinion, the Honorable Joseph H. Hart found that Jennings did not have
a contract of employment and that Jennings only understood that she had a job as long as she
performed her duties and followed Minco's rules. Letter Opinion, May 23, 1987, at 3. After
reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that "at most [Jennings] had only a unilateral
belief that she might be employed for so long as her work was satisfactory and that at no time
was there an agreement or contract creating other than an employment at will." Id.
199. Id. at 3.
200. Letter Opinion, May 23, 1987.




observed, the policy could not be enjoined before discharge if Jennings
would have no cause of action after discharge. 20 3 The court recognized that
under Texas law Jennings had no cause of action for wrongful discharge. 2 °4
The court found that the Texas Supreme Court's most recent pronounce-
ment on the employment-at-will doctrine, Sabine Pilot Service v. Hauck,20 5
provided a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge only when an
employee is discharged for refusing to commit an illegal act.2° 6 The court
also noted that the legislature did not enact any statutory prohibition against
discharging an employee who refused to submit to urinalysis. 20 7 As a result,
Jennings had no cause of action for wrongful discharge for her refusal to
agree to the urinalysis. 20 8
Jennings also argued that under Minco's policy the test would only be
conducted with her consent, but that her consent could not be considered
freely or voluntarily given when her refusal to consent to the test resulted in
her discharge. 20 9 The court recognized, however, that Minco had the right
unilaterally to modify the terms and conditions of her employment, and that
under the at-will doctrine, Jennings was free to accept the new terms or
quit. 210 Therefore, the court denied Jennings's request for injunctive and
declaratory relief.2 11
After addressing the employment-at-will issue, the court then addressed
Jennings's claim that the urinalysis was a violation of her common law right
of privacy.2 12 Jennings urged that two violations of such interests occurred:
(1) the intrusion upon her solitude or seclusion, or into her private affairs;
and (2) the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about her.213
The court disposed first of the latter alleged violation of Jennings's privacy
interest. To establish a cause of action for the public disclosure of embar-
rassing private facts, Jennings must establish that the private facts were com-
municated to more than a small group of persons. 2 14 The court found that
the matter must be communicated to the public at large, such that the mat-
ter becomes one of public knowledge.2 15 The facts reflected that publication
of information relating to the urinalysis would be limited to one or two per-
sons and that procedures were in place to guard against the dissemination of
this information.21 6 Upon these facts, therefore, the court found no cause of
action for the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts.21 7
203. Id.
204. Id. (citing Sabine Pilot Service v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985)).
205. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
206. Letter Opinion at 3.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id. at 4 (citing Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986)).
211. Id.
212. Id.







Regarding Jennings's claim that the urinalysis was an invasion of her pri-
vacy, the court observed that Jennings's cause of action comprised four ele-
ments: (1) an intentional intrusion; (2) upon the seclusion, solitude, or
private affairs of another; (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and (4) an intrusion that is unreasonable, unjustified, or unwar-
ranted. 218 The court found that there could be no intentional intrusion be-
cause Jennings had the ability to prohibit any intrusion at all by refusing to
consent to the urinalysis; therefore, the court concluded, any intrusion could
not be an intentional one. 2 19
Assuming, for argument's sake, that an intentional intrusion occurred, the
court then addressed whether a urinalysis would intrude upon Jennings's
seclusion, solitude, or private affairs so as to be highly offensive to a reason-
able person. 220 The court found that a mandatory urinalysis would, if non-
consensual, intrude upon the seclusion, solitude, or private affairs of an
employee and would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.221 The
court then considered whether the intrusion was unreasonable, unjustified,
or unwarranted. The court observed that resolving this case required it to
weigh competing interests, such as the invasion of the personal privacy
rights of Jennings versus the interests of Minco and others.222 In addition,
determining reasonableness required the court to examine the existence of
reasonable alternatives and other relevant circumstances of the particular
case.
223
Scope and Manner. The drug testing policy implemented by Minco required
all employees to be subjected to random, periodic testing. Individualized
suspicion or impairment on the job was not a prerequisite to testing. The
policy provided that no employee would be tested without that employee's
consent; however, if the employee refused to be tested, the company would
discharge the employee. If, upon testing, the employee tested positive for
use of drugs, the employee could enter a rehabilitation program. If the reha-
bilitation program was ineffective and the employee continued to use drugs,
the employee would be discharged.
Under the policy, urine specimens were to be collected at a private medi-
cal office in such a way that the employee, while providing the specimen,
could not be observed. The policy required Minco to follow the United
States Department of Health and Human Services' guidelines for testing fed-
eral employees and to maintain strict chain of custody procedures after col-
218. Id.
219. Id. (citing Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982); Spencer
v. General Telephone Co., 551 F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1982)).
220. Letter Opinion at 6.
221. Id. at 7 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1987): "There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a
function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public





lection of the specimen. The drug testing policy required the use of an
enzyme immunoassay procedure called "EMIT" to provide an initial screen-
ing. If the specimen tested positive, then the gas chromatography/mass
spectography test would be used to confirm the existence of specific drugs.
This procedure screened illegal drug use only and revealed only indirectly
the existence of a medical condition. Under this testing policy an employee
would not receive notice of the results of a test unless both the preliminary
screening and the conformity tests showed positive results. Then, the em-
ployee was given the opportunity to have the same sample retested by a lab
of his own choosing. If Minco discharged an employee for drug usage, its
policy was not to disclose the reasons for the discharge. Further, no perma-
nent record of the testing was to be retained and only top management
would be aware of the test results. Based upon a review of the evidence
presented and the policy adopted by Minco, the court found that the tests
that Minco intended to employ ensured a high degree of accuracy. 224
Responding to Jennings's argument that before Minco could require such
testing it should have an individualized suspicion of an employee's use of
drugs, the court found substantial evidence in the record that testing only
after suspicion arises may not be adequate to prevent the adverse results of
that use.225 The court noted, for example, that impairment of an employee's
fine motor skills could severely damage the product assembled by the em-
ployee, that this impairment could last for several days after drug use, and
that it could not be detected by the average supervisor. 226 While recognizing
that an untrained person may easily detect gross motor impairment, such as
staggered walking, the court found that fine motor impairment may be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to discern. 227 Accordingly, although the company
might have no individualized suspicion of that particular employee's drug
use, the danger, nevertheless, would exist.228 Thus, the court held that indi-
vidualized suspicion of a particular employee was not a prerequisite to re-
quiring a urinalysis, so long as the method of selection was truly random and
not discriminatory. 229
Justification. The court then addressed whether the urinalysis was justified
under the circumstances. The evidence reflected that Minco was a high-tech
custom processor and packager of micro chips and wafers. A substantial
portion of its product was for defense and aerospace purposes (e.g., space
shuttle) and for medical purposes (e.g., pacemakers), and thus its product
was required to meet extremely high reliability standards and inspections.
The electronic components assembled by Jennings were expensive and frag-
ile and subject to contamination from such things as spittle and oil from an
employee's hand. The evidence reflected that such contamination could








cause corrosion that could not be detected by inspection, but could result in
problems after the product was incorporated into a customer's product
weeks or months later, or possibly, when the customer's product failed as a
result of the contamination. 230 Minco's business obviously would incur sub-
stantial risk if a defective product were discovered by a customer. 23'
The court found that Minco proposed instituting a drug testing program
because of rumors of drug abuse by employees on the job, because of a de-
cline in productivity that Minco feared could be related to drug abuse, and
because of the theft of several hundred thousand dollars worth of inventory
by an employee who was using drugs.232 The court, therefore, concluded
that the drug testing program was justified. 233
Place. Responding to concerns regarding the situs of the urinalysis testing,
the court held that obtaining the urine specimen at a medical office or labo-
ratory away from Minco's facility provided as much protection of an em-
ployee's privacy as practicable.234
Voluntariness. The court also concluded that the exaction of consent to the
urinalysis as a condition of continued employment was not unreasonable. 235
This conclusion was based upon the at-will nature of the employment rela-
tionship, the nature and responsibilities of the employees' jobs, and the lim-
ited scope of the search. 236
Availability of Less Intrusive Means. In determining the reasonableness of
the test, the court stated that the availability of alternative means of intru-
sion must be considered.237 The court concluded that the alternative means
available did not eliminate the need for urinalysis. 238 Because only a highly-
trained person could detect impairment of employees' fine motor skills,
Minco was justified in implementing urine testing to eliminate the very
harmful effects employee drug use might have on its product.239 Simply be-
cause other employers may have deterred drug use without testing does not
mean that drug testing is necessarily unreasonable in particular
circumstances. 240
Effectiveness. Finally, the court addressed the effectiveness of urinalysis.
Even though a urinalysis may fail to detect drugs used more than five days
before testing, the court observed that if the test were randomly adminis-
tered, an employee would not know when to stop taking drugs in order to










240. Id at 10.
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avoid a positive result.241 In addition, the court found that addicts may not
be able to refrain from drug use for a period of five days, and employees may
not always be aware of the fade-away effect. 242 Based upon these factors, the
court concluded that the existence of a random drug testing program would
deter employees from drug abuse.243
In conclusion, Judge Hart found that Minco's drug testing program was
lawful; he observed that in order to reach a different result, he would have to
create an exception to the at-will doctrine, which he was powerless to do.244
B. Employee's Constitutional Right to Privacy
In September 1983 the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation instituted a mandatory polygraph policy for Department em-
ployees. 245 This policy required employees to submit to a polygraph as part
of an investigation of suspected abuse of patients, theft or other criminal
activity on the Department's facilities, or any activity threatening the health
or safety of patients or employees. If an employee refused to submit to a
polygraph under these conditions, he was subject to adverse personnel
action.
After the employees' union filed its lawsuit against the Department to in-
validate the policy, the Department promulgated a rule246 that established
the conditions under which an employee could be dismissed for refusing to
take a polygraph and governed the use of polygraph results in grievance




244. Id. Judge Hart stated:
For me to ignore the fact that [Jennings] is an employee-at-will, would in effect
require me either to legislate or to overturn a decision that has been tested and
confirmed as this State's law for almost 100 years. I neither have the power to
legislate nor to engraft a new exception to the employment at will doctrine as
the Texas Supreme Court did in Sabine Pilot Service. Id.
245. Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retarda-
tion, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987).
246. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, Rule 302.05.03.048.
247. Specifically, the rule provided that an employee could be dismissed for refusing a poly-
graph examination only if there was reasonable cause to believe "(1) that an incident of patient
abuse or illegal on-campus activity [had] occurred; (2) that an employee violated departmental
rules in connection with the incident; and (3) other reasonable investigatory alternatives [had]
been exhausted including, at a minimum, an interview with the employee." 746 S.W.2d at 204
n. 1. The rule provided that all polygraph examination questions had to be "specifically, nar-
rowly and directly related to the employees [sic] performance of his official duties in connec-
tion with the specific incident or necessary for the proper administration of the polygraph
exam." Id.
Polygraph examiners generally ask control questions to establish the subject's reaction when
providing a deceitful answer. Id. at 204. The parties agreed that control questions, which are
often not job-related and require disclosure of personal information, were necessary. Id.
Unless the employee agreed to answer such questions, the rule included a check-list of pro-
hibited questions regarding "religious beliefs, beliefs regarding racial matters, political beliefs
and associations (including union activities), involvement in specific crimes unrelated to the
incident under investigation, and sexual practices unrelated to the incident under investiga-
tion." Id. at 204 n.l.
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took a polygraph nor the test results themselves were admissible in a depart-
mental grievance hearing. The rule did provide, however, that the fact that
the employee refused to participate in a polygraph was admissible in a griev-
ance proceeding arising out of this refusal.
The Texas Supreme Court decided the appeal pursuant to the Texas Con-
stitution. 248 The court held that while the Texas Constitution did not ex-
pressly guarantee a right of privacy, it contained provisions similar to the
United States Constitution, which created "protected 'zones of privacy.' "249
Concluding that the Texas Constitution protects personal privacy rights
from unreasonable intrusion, the court added that this right should prevail
absent an intrusion required to achieve a compelling governmental objective
that is obtainable by no less intrusive or more reasonable means.250
The court then evaluated the Department's interests in implementing a
polygraph policy and whether those interests were compelling enough to
override the employees' right to privacy.2 51 The Department contended that
it was charged by the legislature with the responsibility of maintaining a safe
environment for its patients.2 52 Accordingly, the Department argued that it
had the duty to deter employee misconduct.2 53 Upon balancing the Depart-
ment's objectives against the employees' constitutional right to privacy, the
court determined that the Department's objectives were not adequately com-
pelling to justify abridgment of the privacy rights of the employees. 254
The Texas State Employees Union decision leaves many questions unan-
swered. The most important question for private employers is whether a
cause of action based on the Texas Constitution requires state action. 25 5 If
248. Id. at 205.
249. Id. A right of individual privacy was "implicit among those 'general, great, and essen-
tial principles of liberty and free government' established by the Texas Bill of Rights." Id.
(quoting TEX. CONsT. art. I, Introduction to the Bill of Rights).
250. 746 S.W.2d at 205.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 206. The court recognized TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80(a)(b)(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1988), which states that the Department must provide its patients with "a
humane treatment environment that affords reasonable protection from harm" yet allows the
"rights, benefits, responsibilities, and privileges guaranteed by the constitution and laws ... 
253. 746 S.W.2d at 206.
254. Id. The Texas Supreme Court approved the trial court's conclusion that the "poly-
graph's intrusion is highly offensive to a regular person" and that in light of its unreliability,
polygraph examination was not a reasonable means of identifying employee misconduct. Id.
255. In Jones v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 677 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ), Jones, a nurse, brought a cause of action for wrongful discharge against the
hospital. Jones alleged that the hospital violated her right to freedom of speech under TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 8 by terminating her employment following the publication of her article
critically describing the conflict between the wishes of terminally ill patients and the orders of
attending physicians. The trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals held that while the hospital could discharge Jones for no reason whatso-
ever or upon some basis not constitutionally protected, Jones would have a valid cause of
action if the hospital's decision was grounded upon Jones's constitutionally protected first
amendment freedom of speech. Id. at 225. Although the court reversed the summary judg-
ment because there was no conclusive evidence that the hospital was not an entity governed by
the state action doctrine, the court appeared to leave open the question whether state action
was a necessary element of Jones's cause of action. Id. at 226.
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not, then private employers may be liable to employees in civil actions for
requiring polygraphs or drug testing.
C. Employees' Common Law Right to Privacy
In K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti 256 the court of appeals addressed the issue of the
right of privacy of employees at the employer's place of business. In this
case, the facts reflected that K-Mart provided lockers for employees' use
during working hours. If an employee used one of K-Mart's locks on the
locker, K-Mart retained a copy of the combination or a master key. If em-
ployees used their own locks, however, K-Mart did not require that either a
key or combination be provided to the manager. With K-Mart's knowledge,
Trotti used a locker and provided her own combination lock.
One day Trotti placed her purse in her locker after arriving at work.
Trotti securely locked the locker, but later in the day when she returned to
her locker she found it open. Trotti discovered that her purse and locker
had been thoroughly searched. The store manager searched the locker ap-
parently because another employee had stolen a watch, and several price-
marking guns also were missing. Initially, the manager denied searching
Trotti's locker and purse; then, one month later he admitted conducting the
search. The manager later claimed again that Trotti's purse had not been
searched. Trotti then successfully sued K-Mart for violating her right to
privacy.
Before addressing K-Mart's points of error, the court of appeals stated
that the right to privacy is essentially the basic right to be left alone.257 The
court observed that in Texas an actionable invasion of privacy by intrusion
must rise to the level of an unjustified intrusion on the plaintiff that would
cause severe offense, humiliation, or outrage to an ordinary individual. 258 In
addressing K-Mart's no evidence or insufficient evidence points of error, the
court observed that the lockers belonged to K-Mart and that a jury could
infer that in the lockers' unlocked state they were subject to searches by K-
Mart. 259 When K-Mart provided a lock for the locker and retained the com-
bination or master key, one could also infer that K-Mart maintained control
over the locker and had a legitimate interest in conducting a reasonable
search of the locker. 26° The court, however, found that when the employee
used her own lock, both the employer and the employee had an expectation
that the locker and its contents would be free from intrusion.261 The court
observed that the basis of Trotti's cause of action for invasion of privacy was
256. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam,
686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985).
257. 677 S.W.2d at 635.
258. Id. at 636. The court observed that "accepting a definition of invasion of privacy
which lacked a standard of high offensiveness would result in fundamentally unfair assess-
ments against defendants who offended unreasonably sensitive plaintiffs, but whose transgres-
sions would not realistically fill either an ordinary person or the general society with any sense






that K-Mart violated her right to be left alone, and that Trotti could recover
at least nominal damages for that intrusion. 262 Concluding that the evidence
was sufficient to support the jury's findings, the court held that Trotti, by
placing a lock on the locker at her own expense and with K-Mart's consent,
demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the locker and
those personal effects within it.263
D. AIDS Testing Legislation: House Bill 1829
During the last two days of the 1987 regular session, the Texas Legislature
enacted House Bill 1829,264 which amends the Communicable Disease Pre-
vention and Control Act (the Act).265 In addition to other matters, H.B.
1829 specifically addresses testing for AIDS.
Testing. Effective September 1, 1987, H.B. 1829 generally prohibits, with
certain exceptions, AIDS testing in Texas.266 The seven exceptions that do
permit AIDS testing are narrowly drafted. AIDS testing is allowed in Texas
if the test is necessary:
1. "[A]s a bona fide occupational qualification and there exists no less
discriminatory means of satisfying the occupational qualification. '267 Bona
fide occupational qualification, as defined by the Commission on Human
Rights Act, is a qualification: "(A) that is reasonably related to the satisfac-
tory performance of the duties of a job; and (B) for which there is a factual
basis for believing that a person of the excluded group would be unable to
perform satisfactorily the duties of the job with safety or efficiency." '268
2. "[T]o screen blood, blood products, bodily fluids, organs, or tissues
for the purpose of determining suitability for donation. '269
3. "[I]n relation to a particular person under this Act. ' 270 This excep-
tion probably deals with the state or local health authorities' ability to re-
quire testing of a particular person under limited conditions when necessary
for the protection of public health.
4. "[T]o test residents and clients of residential facilities of the Texas
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation [TDMHMR]
. "...-271 The test may be administered only if the result "would change the
medical or social management of the person tested or others who associated
262. Id. at 638.
263. Id.
264. Tex. H.B. 1829, 70th Leg. (1987).
265. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, §§ 9.01-.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
266. Id. § 9.02(a) Provides:
A person or entity may not require another person to undergo any medical pro-
cedure or test designed to show or help show whether a person has AIDS or
HIV infection, antibodies to HIV, or infection with any other probable causative
agent of AIDS unless required under Subsection (c) or (g) of this section ... or
unless the medical procedure or test is necessary: [exceptions].
267. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
268. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 2.01(1) (Vernon 1987).
269. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 9.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
270. Id. § 9.02(a)(3).
271. Id. § 9.02(a)(4).
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with that person, '272 and "if the test is conducted in accordance with guide-
lines . . . adopted by the residential facility or the [TDMHMR], and ap-
proved by the [Texas Department of Health]. 273
5. "[T]o manage accidental exposure to blood or other bodily fluids, but
only if the test is conducted in accordance with written infectious disease
control protocols adopted by the health care agency or facility .... -274 The
protocols must "establish procedural guidelines that provide criteria for test-
ing and that respect the rights of the person with the infection and the per-
son who may be exposed to that infection" and "must ensure the
confidentiality of the person with the infection in accordance with the
Act."'275 The person exposed may not be required to be tested under this
exception. 276
6. A test may be required for a patient "if a medical procedure is to be
performed on the patient that could expose health care personnel to AIDS
or HIV infection. ' 277 The conditions that constitute possible exposure to
AIDS or HIV infection must accord with Texas Board of Health guide-
lines. 278 Sufficient time must be available for the test result to be received
before the procedure is conducted. 279
7. The Texas Board of Health can adopt emergency mandatory testing
rules for HIV infection if the Commissioner of Health determines that there
is a sudden and imminent public health threat.2 0
It should be emphasized that even if one of these seven exceptions exists,
the Act provides there is no duty to test for AIDS, and a cause of action does
not arise for the failure to test for AIDS.281
Confidentiality. The Act provides that a test result is confidential. 282 A test
result is defined broadly; the fact that a person has been tested is confidential
and may not be disclosed except as provided in the Act. 283 The Act
provides:
272. Id. § 9.02(a)(4)(A).
273. Id. § 9.02(a)(4)(B).
274. Id. § 9.02(a)(5).
275. Id. § 9.02(d).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 9.02(g).
278. Id. To date, the Texas Board of Health has not issued these guidelines, and they
probably will not be available until early 1988.
279. Id.
280. Id. § 9.02(c). H.B. 1829 also authorizes the Texas Board of Health to promulgate
emergency rules for mandatory testing as a condition for obtaining a marriage license when the
prevalence rate of confirmed positive HIV infection is .83 percent. Id. § 9.-02(e).
281. Id. § 9.02(f).
282. Id. § 9.03(a).
283. Id. § 9.01(5). Test result is defined as:
[A]ny statement or assertion that any identifiable individual is positive, negative,
at risk, has or does not have a certain level of antigen or antibody, or any other
statement that indicates that an identifiable individual has or has not been tested
for AIDS or HIV infection, antibodies to HIV, or infection with any other prob-
able causative agent of AIDS.
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A test result may be released only to:
(1) the [Texas Department of Health];
(2) a local health authority [pursuant to the regulations adopted by
the Texas Department of Health];
(3) the Centers for Disease Control of the United States Public
Health Service if reporting is required by federal law or regulation;
(4) the physician or other person authorized by law who ordered
the test;
(5) a physician, nurse, or other health care personnel who have a
legitimate need to know the test result in order to provide for their pro-
tection and to provide for the patient's health and welfare;
(6) the person tested or a person legally authorized to consent to the
test on the person's behalf; and
(7) the spouse of the person tested if the person tests positive...
and the physician who ordered the test makes the notification. [The
Act] does not provide a duty to notify the spouse, and a cause of action
does not arise.., for the failure [of the physician] to make that notifica-
tion .... 284
These disclosure limitations do not prohibit a health care worker from view-
ing test results while performing his job if his duties entail working with
medical records. 285 The person tested, if he so chooses, may voluntarily re-
lease his test results to others or authorize the release of his test results28 6 if
the authorization: (a) is in writing; (b) is signed by the person tested; and
(c) lists the person or entities (or classification of persons or entities) to
whom the test results may be released.287
Penalties. Any person who is injured by unauthorized testing or unauthor-
ized disclosure or release of a test result may bring a suit entitling him to
actual damages, a civil penalty of not more than $1,000, and his court costs,
and reasonable attorney's fees. 288 In addition to the actual damages and
attorney's fees, the civil penalty may be increased from $1,000 to $5,000 per
incident for wilful disclosure or release of test results. 289 Testing in violation
of the Act or disclosure of a test result in violation of the Act may also
subject an individual to Class A misdemeanor charges in limited situations.
An individual adjudged guilty of a Class A misdemeanor shall be punished
by a fine up to $2,000, a jail term not to exceed one year, or both.29° Under
section 12.51 of the Texas Penal Code ("Authorized Punishments for Corpo-
rations and Associations"), if a corporation or association is adjudged guilty
of a Class A misdemeanor, a court may assess a fine not to exceed
$10,000.291 In lieu of a fine, however, if the court finds that the corporation
284. Id. § 9.03(b)(1)-(7).
285. Id. § 9.03(i).
286. Id. § 9.03(c)(1)-(2).
287. Id. § 9.03(d).
288. Id. § 9.04(b)-(c).
289. Id. § 9.04(d).
290. See TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.21 (Vernon 1974).
291. See id. § 12.51(b)(2).
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or association gained money or property or caused personal injury, property
damage, or other loss through commission of a Class A misdemeanor, the
fine assessed may be double the amount gained or caused to be lost, which-
ever is greater. 292 Furthermore, the court can order notice of the conviction
to be given to any person the court deems appropriate. 293
Effect of H.B. 1829 Upon Employers. As provided in H.B. 1829, mandatory
AIDS testing is generally prohibited unless one of the limited exceptions of
section 9.02 of the Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Act ap-
plies. The bill contains no comprehensive exemption permitting employers
to test job applicants for AIDS. Thus, on its face, H.B. 1829 prohibits the
employer from testing job applicants for AIDS unless the employer can
prove that the test is necessary as a bona fide occupational qualification. 294
After the passage of H.B. 1829, the State Board of Insurance was immedi-
ately confronted by insurance companies concerned that they would be pro-
hibited from AIDS testing. The State Board of Insurance responded quickly
and adopted an emergency ruling allowing insurance companies to test ap-
plicants for AIDS, provided all members in the same class are tested on a
nondiscriminatory basis and test results indicating the presence of HIV an-
tibodies are confirmed by the three-test method, (two ELISA tests and a
western blot blood test).295 The chairman of the Board of Insurance noted
that AIDS is a disease and testing for AIDS does not constitute unfair dis-
crimination in an industry inherently discriminatory. On December 4, 1987,
the State Board of Insurance renewed the effectiveness of the emergency
adoption on new section 21.705 of title 28 of the Texas Revised Civil Stat-
utes for a sixty-day period, which expires on February 7, 1988.296
Presumably, employers with group insurance plans that exclude or limit
coverage for AIDS or AIDS-related expenses will be able to rely upon the
ruling of the State Board of Insurance, at least when AIDS testing is for the
purpose of applying the insurance provisions, and the insurance company
directs the testing. The conflict, however, between the ruling by the State
Board of Insurance allowing AIDS testing and the prohibition of such test-
ing contained within H.B. 1829 makes future litigation almost inevitable,
especially in light of the attorney general's opinion indicating AIDS is to be
treated as a handicap under the TCHRA. 297
292. See id. § 12.51(c).
293. See id. § 12.5 1(d).
294. See also Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-648 (1987) (discrimination is not unlawful if the
person is not "otherwise qualified" for the job due to a reasonable medical risk of contagion).
295. Tex. State Bd. of Ins., 12 Tex. Reg. 2706 (Aug. 18, 1987).
296. Tex. State Bd. of Ins., 12 Tex. Reg. 4616 (Dec. 11, 1987).
297. With respect to employer insurance plans, issues relating to the preemptive impact of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982) should be con-
sidered. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549, 95 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1987); Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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V. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND BoYcoTTs
Within a seven-month period, several Texas statutes 298 that attempted to
regulate picketing were held unconstitutional by two federal district
courts.299 Both decisions have been appealed to the Fifth Circuit and have
been argued. 30 Subsequently, a state court of appeals declined to follow the
federal district courts and upheld one of the statutes found to be unconstitu-
tional by the federal courts. 30 1
In Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.30 2 the Texas Farm
Workers Union (TFWU) attempted to organize onion harvest and packing
shed workers in several counties during the 1980 onion harvest. The TFWU
began their organizing efforts knowing that a harvest season strike would
pressure onion growers due to anticipated large monetary losses resulting
from unharvested, rotting produce. The TFWU was seeking higher wages
and better working conditions, as well as union representation for the
workers.
The TFWU set up its first picket line at one of the onion fields along the
public road near the field being harvested. As the field workers arrived the
picketers talked to them and handed them leaflets. The picketers attempted
neither to block the entrances to the field nor to prevent workers from enter-
ing. The picketers did shout to the workers in the field and used a loud-
speaker urging them to strike. Although some picketers denounced those
workers who remained in the field, no threats were made and there was no
violence.
As support for the strike increased, the TFWU established similar picket
lines at other onion fields. In a short period of time, nearly all of the workers
left the onion fields. In response, several growers, packers, and trade as-
sociations sought a temporary restraining order in state district court, alleg-
ing numerous violations of the Texas picketing statutes. 30 3 The state district
court issued a temporary restraining order that restrained the picketers from
violating the Texas picketing statutes.3°4
Immediately, the TFWU removed the case to federal court.30 5 After the
case was removed, the TFWU sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
grounds that article 5154d section 1(1), commonly known as the numbers
298. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, § 2, art. 5154d, § 3, art. 5154f, § 2(b), art.
5154f, § 2(d), art. 5154f, § 2(e), art. 5154g, § 2 (Vernon 1987).
299. Nash v. Texas, 632 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Tex. 1986), appeal docketed, No. 86-2327 (5th
Cir. May 8, 1986); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 916 (N.D.
Tex. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-1572 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 1985).
300. Gault and Nash were argued Nov. 3, 1986.
301. Olvera v. State, 725 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. requested)
(Levy, J., dissenting).
302. 615 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Tex. 1985), appeal docketed, No. 85-1572 (5th Cir. Sept. 11,
1985).
303. 615 F. Supp. at 927.
304. Id. at 927-28.
305. Id. at 928.
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and distance formula, was unconstitutionally overbroad. 3°6 The court ob-
served that the statute would be unconstitutionally overbroad if the statute,
as written and as construed by the authoritative state court, effectively
reached constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected con-
duct.307 The court found that section 1(1) was overbroad and adopted the
reasoning of the district court in Medrano v. Allee.308
The Medrano court relied upon Cameron v. Johnson 3o9 and Davis v. Fran-
cois 310 in declaring that a statute regulating picketing must identify specifi-
cally the type of antisocial conduct it seeks to prohibit when it authorizes a
prohibition or a limitation upon picketing. 311 The court found that the
numbers and distance formula established in article 5154d, section 1 did not
define prohibited picketing in terms of "an evil to be prevented or a right
secured, e.g., to prevent violence or to assure reasonable access to a home or
business. ' 3 12 The Medrano court stated that section 1 would require law
officers to restrict legitimate as well as illegitimate conduct.3a 3 Quoting
Medrano, the Gault court concluded that there are circumstances in which
such restrictions are overly broad. 314
Article 5154d, section 1(2) provides a second definition of prohibited mass
picketing. 315 The parties agreed that section 1(2), as construed by the Texas
306. Id. at 929. Although other issues were addressed by the district court, those issues are
beyond the scope of this Article. Article 5154d, §§ 1 and 1(1) provide:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with others,
to engage in picketing or any form of picketing activity that shall constitute
mass picketing as herein defined.
"Mass picketing," as that term is used herein, shall mean any form of picketing
in which:
1. There are more than two (2) pickets at any time within either fifty (50) feet
of any entrance to the premises being picketed, or within fifty (50) feet of any
other picket or pickets.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, § 1, 1(1) (Vernon 1987).
307. 615 F. Supp. at 945 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
308. Id. at 946 (relying upon Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605, 622-25 (S.D. Tex.
1972)). The United States Supreme Court later vacated this part of the Medrano judgment and
remanded the case for further findings. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 820 (1974). On
remand, the plaintiffs withdrew their challenge to the facial constitutionality of the statutes,
615 F. Supp. at 943, rendering the original holding in Medrano dictum, id. at 946.
309. 390 U.S. 611 (1986).
310. 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1968).
311. 347 F. Supp. at 624.
312. Id.
313. Id. The Medrano court characterized article 5154d, § 1 as providing a "mathematical
straitjacket [sic] which does not permit law officers or courts to take into account the factual
context of a particular picket line." Id.
314. 615 F. Supp. at 946 (quoting Medrano, 347 F. Supp. at 624). "Little imagination is
required to envisage circumstances where groups of demonstrators, substantially larger than
two persons, standing at closer quarters than fifty feet would not threaten the safe flow of
traffic nor unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress from nearby buildings." Id.
315. Article 5154d, § 1(2) defines mass picketing as:
Pickets constitute or form any character of obstacle to the free ingress to and
egress from any entrance to any premises being picketed or to any other prem-
ises, either by obstructing said free ingress or egress by their persons or by the
placing of vehicles or other physical obstructions.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, § 1(2) (Vernon 1987).
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Court of Criminal Appeals, 3 16 did not unconstitutionally infringe upon
first amendment rights; therefore, the court did not pass upon its
constitutionality. 31 7
The TFWU argued that section 2318 was an unconstitutionally overbroad
regulation of pure speech, while the state contended that section 2 focused
on words in the context of conduct.31 9 The court observed that the "fighting
words" exception to first amendment protection urged by the state was a
very narrow exception 320 and that section 2 was not limited to the "fighting
words" context. 3 2' The court found that the statute criminalized constitu-
tionally protected speech, not limited to labor picketing, and that it extended
to the spoken, broadcast, and written word.322 The state conceded that sec-
tion 3323 was unconstitutional to the extent that when applied with article
5154f, section 5324 the result was an unconstitutional prior restraint on
otherwise protected speech. 325 The TFWU argued that beyond the state's
concession, section 3 was also unconstitutionally broad.326 The court, how-
316. The court of criminal appeals narrowly construed § 1(2):
As we construe this statute, in a criminal prosecution for its violation, the State
must prove that a person
(1) singly, or in concert with others
(2) intentionally, knowingly or recklessly
(3) engaged in picketing in which
(4) pickets constituted or formed any character (type) of obstacle
(5) which by their persons or by the placing of vehicles or any other physical
obstructions
(6) rendered impassable or unreasonably inconvenient or hazardous the free
ingress to or egress from any entrance to any premises being picketed or to any
other premises.
Sherman v. State, 626 S.W.2d 520, 527-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
317. 615 F. Supp. at 947.
318. Article 5154d, § 2 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with others, by use of
insulting, threatening or obscene language, to interfere with, hinder, obstruct, or
intimidate, or seek to interfere with, hinder, obstruct, or intimate, another in the
exercise of his lawful right to work, or to enter upon the performance of any
lawful vocation, or from freely entering or leaving any premises. TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, § 2 (Vernon 1987).
319. 615 F. Supp. at 948.
320. Id. at 948-49.
321. Id. at 949. The court rejected the state's contention that the Texas Supreme Court
limited § 2 to "fighting words" in Dallas Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Wamix,
Inc., 156 Tex. 408, 424-25, 295 S.W.2d 873, 884 (Tex. 1956). 615 F. Supp. at 950.
322. 615 F. Supp. at 949. The court concluded, "[I]ts overbreadth is breathtaking." Id.
323. Article 5154d, § 3 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with others, to engage in
picketing or any form of picketing activities, where any part of such picketing is
accompanied by slander, libel, or the public display or publication of oral or
written misrepresentations. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154d, § 3
(Vernon 1987).
324. Article 5154f, § 5 provides: "The State of Texas, through its Attorney General or any
District or County Attorney, may institute a suit in the District Court to enjoin any person...
from violating any provision of this Act." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5154f, § 5 (Vernon
1987).
325. 615 F. Supp. at 950.
326. Id. at 951. The TFWU relied upon Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) and Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974). Since federal labor law did not control the disputed
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ever, rejected both the state's and the TFWU's arguments. The court ob-
served that section 3 imposed strict criminal liability because it forbade any
misrepresentation without regard to fault.327 The court found that by
criminalizing a misrepresentation without fault and without regard to
whether the speech is on a topic of public concern, section 3 proscribed a
significant amount of constitutionally protected speech and was therefore
unconstitutionally broad. 328
The TFWU also argued that article 5154f, which prohibits secondary
strikes, secondary picketing, and secondary boycotts, was unconstitutional
because it restricted protected picketing rights of unions that do not repre-
sent a majority of workers. 329 While conceding its unconstitutionality, the
state argued that it was unconstitutional only to the extent that it forbade
picketing by less than a majority of a company's employees. 330 The court
observed that two years after the legislature passed article 5154f, the Texas
Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional because it defined "labor
dispute" too restrictively as a controversy between an employer and his em-
ployees and prohibited all picketing that did not fall within that narrow con-
text. 331 Thus, the court found that with this "keystone" gone, article 5154f,
sections 2(b), 2(d), and 2(e) must fall because they are overbroad. 332 The
court again adopted the district court's reasoning in Medrano v. Allee.333
The Medrano court found that section 2(d)'s sanction was precisely that
which the United States Supreme Court in Swing held to be inconsistent
with the first amendment. 334 Finding that section 2(d) clearly relied on the
absence of an employer-employee relationship, the Medrano court held that
the section was an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of speech. 335
The court found that both parties misconstrued article 5154g, section 2 .336
agricultural union organization, the court held that the TFWU's reliance was misplaced. 615
F. Supp. at 952.
327. 615 F. Supp. at 952. The court found § 3 forbade "any oral or written misrepresenta-
tion concerning anything, any person, or any matter, without regard to knowledge of the fal-
sity of the misrepresentation or any other standard of fault." Id.
328. Id. at 953. The court relied upon Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) and Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Referring to Gertz, the court observed that if the
media could not be held civilly liable without fault, then criminal liability without fault should
not attach to uneducated and illiterate farm workers where the speech relates to matters of
public concern. 615 F. Supp. at 953.
329. 615 F. Supp. at 954.
330. Id.
331. Id. (citing International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Cox, 148 Tex. 42, 219 S.W.2d
787 (1949).
332. 615 F. Supp. at 954.
333. Id. (relying upon Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605, 625-28 (S.D. Tex. 1972), va-
cated and remanded, 416 U.S. 802 (1974)). The Medrano court quoted American Fed'n of
Labor v. Swing: "A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of
free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and
workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him." 312
U.S. 321, 326 (1941).
334. 347 F. Supp. at 627.
335. Id.
336. 615 F. Supp. at 955. Article 5154g, § 2 prohibits:
[A]ny strike or picketing, an object of which is to urge, compel, force or coerce
any employer to recognize or bargain with, or any employee or group of em-
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The court observed that section 2 was not concerned with who could picket
and how; rather, section 2 bans any picketing intended to compel employer
recognition of a minority union or to compel an employee to align with a
minority union.337 The court held that since section 2 outlawed even peace-
ful picketing on the basis of its objective, section 2 is unconstitutional.33 8
The court added that the constitutionality of section 2 then turned on
whether the prohibited objectives-recognition and bargaining by an em-
ployer, joining and selection as a bargaining representative by an employee-
could be constitutionally outlawed. 339 The court stated that although states
could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing whose objective was prohib-
ited by right-to-work laws, section 2 outlawed picketing whose objectives
were not otherwise unlawful. 34° As such, the court concluded that section 2
prohibited peaceful picketing to attain a lawful objective and therefore was a
constitutionally impermissible restraint. 341 The court's opinion is currently
being reviewed on appeal.
In Nash v. Texas 342 the federal district court also reviewed whether article
5154d, sections 1 and 2 violated the plaintiffs' right to free expression under
the first amendment. 343 The plaintiffs in Nash further argued that article
5154d was overbroad and vague.3 "4 The court noted that each of sections 1
and 2 restricted speech in a different way: the numbers and distance provi-
sion was a time, place, and manner restriction of picketing, while the intimi-
dating language provision, prohibiting the use of certain classifications of
speech on a picket line, was a content-based regulation.345
The court initially observed that the overbreadth doctrine applied to an
analysis of time, place, and manner statutes.346 After reviewing article
5154d, the court concluded that the statute applied to all picketing whether
in a labor dispute or in some other controversy. 347 The court's analysis of
section 1(1) of article 5154d addressed four issues: (1) whether there was a
compelling state interest; (2) whether section 1(1) was content-neutral;
(3) whether section 1(1) was narrowly drawn; and (4) whether section 1(1)
was rationally related to the state interest.3 48
To support its claim of compelling state interest, the state argued that the
ployees to join or select as their representative, any labor union or labor organi-
zation which is not in fact the representative of a majority of the employees of an
employer or, if the employer operates two or more separate and distinct places
of business, is not in fact the representative of a majority of such employees at
the place or places of business subjected to such strike or picketing.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154g, § 2 (Vernon 1987).
337. 615 F. Supp. at 955.
338. Id. at 955-56.
339. Id. at 956.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. 632 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
343. Id. at 956.
344. Id. at 967.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 967.
348. Id. at 968-72.
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numbers and distance restriction in section 1(1) helped prevent violence. 349
Rejecting this argument, the court found no permissible state interest in re-
quiring more than two pickets to remain fifty feet from a building entrance
and from one another.350
Although the court found that the numbers and distance provision was
not aimed at a particular group of picketers, and was, therefore, a content-
neutral statute, 351 it nevertheless determined that the formula was not nar-
rowly drawn and did not allow alternate channels of communication.3 52
The court concluded that section 1(1) thus denied picketers many meaning-
ful methods of expression and forced them to disperse, with a resulting loss
of effectiveness. 353 Finally, the court concluded that the numbers and dis-
tance formula imposed restrictions that were not rationally related to the
alleged state interest of preventing violence because the fifty-foot limitation
was arbitrary. 354
The court next addressed the plaintiffs' contention that article 5154d, sec-
tion 2 was an unconstitutional abridgement of their rights under the first
amendment.355 Since section 2 expressly regulated speech and thus consti-
tuted a content-based regulation, the court observed that it must be carefully
drawn or be construed by the courts in such a way as to punish only unpro-
tected speech and not be susceptible of an interpretation that would burden
protected speech. 356 The court then addressed the following issues in its
analysis of the constitutionality of article 5154d, section 2: (1) whether sec-
tion 2 only prohibits fighting words; and (2) whether section 2 was narrowly
drawn. 357
The court rejected the state's argument that section 2 was limited to fight-
ing words and held that no aggressive behavior was required to violate sec-
tion 2. The statute provides that a violation occurs when a person seeks only
by language to interfere with, hinder, obstruct, or intimidate another in any
of the activities to which the statute refers.358
Addressing whether section 2 was narrowly drawn, the court noted that
section 2 would be unconstitutionally overbroad if it restricted protected as
well as unprotected speech.3 59 Citing three other cases, 360 the court ob-
349. Id. at 969.
350. Id. at 970.
351. Id. at 970-71.
352. Id. at 971.
353. Id. (citing Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1968)).
354. 632 F. Supp. at 971. In summary, the court stated that "[t]he numbers distance provi-
sion facially does not allow adequate 'breathing space'; its overbreadth-its unnecessary sti-
fling of First Amendment rights-renders it unconstitutional." Id at 972.
355. Id. at 972-73.
356. Id. at 973 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972)).
357. Id. at 973-76.
358. Id. at 973.
359. Id. at 975.
360. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (ordinance prohibiting "opprobri-
ous" language is unconstitutional); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (statutory restric-
tion on words that "tended to cause a breach of the peace" is unconstitutional); Hill v. City of
Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 1169 (5th Cir. 1985) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance mak-
ing it "unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or
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served that under section 2 a picketer need only seek to intimidate another
person, but he need not actually breach the peace or intimidate or obstruct
another person.3 61 The court also observed that the statute did not require
that a picketer intend to violate the statute with the result that an arrest
would be discretionary with law enforcement officers, allowing the possibil-
ity of capricious and unreasonable enforcement. 362 The court concluded
that the statute was not narrowly drawn,3 63 and was therefore overbroad. 364
In addition to overbreadth, the court analyzed article 5154d, section 2 for
vagueness. 365 The court stated that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
when it: (1) fails to warn a citizen that his conduct may be illegal, and
(2) invests law enforcement officers with on-the-spot legislative power to ap-
ply the statute or not at their discretion. 366 The court stated that section 2
proscribed such broad categories of speech that the meaning of the words
"insult," "threaten," "obscene," "interfere with," "hinder," "obstruct," and
"intimidate" becomes unclear. 367 Thus, the court concluded that persons of
common intelligence could not determine what words to avoid to remain
within the laws, moreover, the court added, the discretion of law enforce-
ment officers was not sufficiently limited. 368
In conclusion, the court found that article 5154d was not drafted with the
precision necessary to avoid a first amendment challenge. 369 The court held
that section 1(1) and section 2 were unconstitutionally overbroad and that
section 2 was also unconstitutionally vague.370 The court's opinion is cur-
rently being reviewed on appeal.
In Olvera v. State371 the court of appeals rejected the federal courtS' 372
conclusion that article 5154d, section 1 is unconstitutional. In Olvera each
defendant was charged with intentionally or knowingly engaging in mass
picketing by coming within fifty feet of an entrance to the property being
picketed 373 and was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of mass picketing
under article 5154d, section 1(1).374 On appeal, the defendants argued that
interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in mak-
ing an arrest").
361. 632 F. Supp. at 975.
362. Id. at 975-76, comparing article 5154d, § 2 to the federal statute held constitutional in
Committee in Solidarity With the People of El Salvador v. F.B.I., 770 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1985).
363. 632 F. Supp. at 976.
364. Id. at 979.
365. Id. at 979-80.
366. Id. at 979.
367. Id. at 980.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 980-81.
370. Id. at 981.
371. 725 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. requested).
372. Nash v. Texas, 632 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Tex. 1986); Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural
Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Medrano v. Allee, 347 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.
Tex. 1972). In his dissent, Justice Levy agreed with Nash, Gault, and Medrano and would
have held article 5154d, § 1(1) unconstitutional. 725 S.W.2d at 408.




article 5154d, section 1(1) was facially unconstitutional 375 because the num-
bers and distance formula used to define mass picketing was arbitrarily over-
broad and because it provided no reference to the surrounding
circumstances. 376
The court observed that picketing intertwines speech and conduct, raising
possible speech limitations so the government can control conduct. 377 The
court stated that state regulation of first amendment conduct is justified if
four factors coincide: (1) if the regulation is within the constitutional power
of the government; (2) if the regulation furthers an important or substantial
government interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on first
amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
378
Concluding that the four factors were satisfied by the state regulation, the
court found that the prevention of violence and obstruction of traffic was a
significant state interest and that section l(1)'s regulation did not unreasona-
bly interfere with the dissemination of speech or the freedom to distribute
information.379 Rejecting the federal district court's conclusion in Gault
that section 1(1) was overbroad, the court stated that the Gault court and
the Medrano court failed to recognize that the prevention of violence is a
valid state interest and that the state's interest in maintaining free passage-
way in public areas justified some first amendment infringement.380
VI. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the decisions discussed, particularly the decisions of the
375. The defendants relied upon U.S. CONST. amends. I and 14 and TEX. CONST. art. I,
§§ 8 and 27. However, the court limited its analysis of the constitutionality of article 5154d,
§ 1(1) to the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 725 S.W.2d at 401 n.2.
376. 725 S.W.2d at 401. The defendants also argued that article 5154d, § 1(1) was uncon-
stitutional as applied to the facts of their case, id. at 405; however, the court summarily re-
jected this argument, id. at 406.
377. Id. at 402. "[W]hen 'speech' and 'non speech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non speech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. (quoting United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
378. Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
379. Id. at 402-03 (agreeing with Geissler v. Coussoulis, 424 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
380. Id at 405; see also Right to Life Advocates, Inc. v. Aaron Women's Clinic, 737
S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) (Cannon, J., concurring in
result only; Pressler, J., dissenting). In Right to Life Advocates the court affirmed the trial
court's permanent injunction limiting the right to life advocate picketing of a general use office
building which included an abortion clinic. The court applied the following balancing test to
determine whether the injunction was appropriate Under TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 8: "(1) the
nature, purposes, and primary use of the property...; (2) the extent and nature of the public's
invitation to use that property; and (3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken
upon [the property] in relation to both the private and public use of the property." 737 S.W.2d
at 567. After analyzing these factors, the court concluded that the permanent injunction,
which allowed the picketers to picket on the public sidewalk in front of the building, was a




Texas Supreme Court, 38 we are in a period of judicial activism with respect
to employment law developments in Texas. Adherence to the principles of
stare decisis and judicial restraint is, at best, minimal. The concurring opin-
ion of Justice Mauzy in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes382
should serve as a forewarning to employers and their counsel. In response to
Justice Gonzalez's and Chief Justice Hill's criticism of the majority opinion's
''excursion into the legislative arena" and the departure from established
precedent, 38 3 Justice Mauzy explained the fundamental reason for the
Court's action succinctly: "the makeup of the court has changed.
384
381. Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retarda-
tion, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987); Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987);
Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987); Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725
S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987); Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co., 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1985); Sabine Pilot
Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
382. 741 S.W.2d 349, 361 (Tex. 1987).
383. Id. at 356-57.
384. Id. at 362. Emphasizing that "[t]he people, speaking through the elective process,
have constituted a new majority of this court. . .," Justice Mauzy charged that the court had
both the power and the duty to expand or limit the law ... dependent upon the perceived ills
of a changing society." Id. (emphasis added).
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